As commander of the First Corps in 1983, al-Mehiawy played a central role in the mass arrest and disappearance of Barzani men and boys. A confidential order dated 25 August 1983 instructed the comprehensive control and monitoring of the Sadiq district and the Diana subdistrict and mandated the formation of a rapid-response force. Under his command, First Corps units surrounded the camps of Diana, Harir, Baharka, and Qushtapa in late August 1983, arresting all men and boys over the age of twelve and transferring them to the security directorate. Thousands were detained, all of whom were later killed.

Lieutenant Colonel Naʿma Fares al-Mehiawy, a senior Iraqi military officer long implicated in the 1983 Barzani mass arrests and the 1988 Anfal campaign and formally summoned by the Iraqi High Criminal Court, died in Austria on 28 August 2025 without ever standing trial. Although he lived openly in Austria and was known to both the authorities in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, neither government made any attempt to arrest or extradite him. Both remained silent. By contrast, states such as Israel have demonstrated a willingness to pursue even low-ranking perpetrators of historical atrocities many decades after the crime. In the case of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, however, there was no comparable effort to pursue a high-ranking officer alleged to have played a significant role in major crimes, nor any interest in reopening his case.

Naʿma Fares al-Mehiawy graduated from the Iraqi Military College in 1960 and the Staff College in 1970. He later emerged as a prominent figure within the Military Council and is frequently described as a close associate of Saddam Hussein. Historical accounts indicate that he was among the young Ba’ath Party members who participated in the 9 February 1963 coup against Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim; some accounts further suggest that he may have been among those involved in the execution of Qasim.

During the Iraq–Iran War, he rose steadily through the ranks, ultimately attaining the rank of Staff Lieutenant General. He also served as a Security Officer (Amin Sirr) within the H´ttein and Yarmouk divisions. He was accused of participating in war crimes between 1980 and 1988, particularly in relation to operations in the Fourth Sector (Misan Province) and the Second Corps (Diyala).

As commander of the First Corps in 1983, al-Mehiawy played a central role in the mass arrest and disappearance of Barzani men and boys. A confidential order dated 25 August 1983 instructed the comprehensive control and monitoring of the Sadiq district and the Diana subdistrict and mandated the formation of a rapid-response force. Under his command, First Corps units surrounded the camps of Diana, Harir, Baharka, and Qushtapa in late August 1983, arresting all men and boys over the age of twelve and transferring them to the security directorate. Thousands were detained, all of whom were later killed.

During the first phase of the Anfal campaign in 1988, al-Mehiawy served as Deputy Commander of the Fifth Corps and received the Medal of Bravery from Saddam Hussein. Under his supervision, and in coordination with Sultan Hashim, the Fifth Corps took part in operations in the Jafati Valley and along the Bengird and Kani Tu fronts, during which civilians were captured and many remain missing.

In the 1990s, he served as president of Bakr University and later as Iraq’s ambassador to Austria, where he eventually applied for asylum. He maintained ties with senior figures of the former regime until the Ba’ath government collapsed in April 2003.

After the fall of the Ba’ath regime, his name appeared in Decision No. 1 (2 January 2005) issued by the Intelligence Directorate affiliated with the National De-Ba’athification Commission. On 8 December 2005, the Investigative Judge of the Iraqi High Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for 24 senior officers and several leaders of the National Defense Brigades. Al-Mehiawy was listed as number 13. That same day, an order was issued to seize the assets of all accused persons; the order was reissued on 27 December 2005. On 29 December 2005, the Investigative Judge requested additional information concerning eight officers, listing al-Mehiawy second, immediately after Nazar al-Khazraji. This directive was reissued multiple times, including on 18 January 2006. A separate arrest warrant issued by the High Criminal Court identified al-Mehiawy in his capacity as commander of the First Corps and charged him under Article 12 of the Court’s statute. A later document confirmed that he was residing in Austria.

Despite these measures, no effort was made to arrest him. His name appeared in at least eleven official court documents, yet these actions remained purely symbolic. In jurisdictions governed by the rule of law, individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity are expected to be arrested and brought before a court. However, in Iraq, the enforcement of judicial orders depends heavily on political will. When political authorities oppose enforcement, even high-level judicial decisions remain ineffective.

In the Anfal genocide case, only a small number of high-ranking officials were prosecuted, including Ali Hassan al-Majid, Sultan Hashim, Farhan Mutlak, Sabir Aziz, Hussein Rashid, and Tahir Tawfiq. In the Barzani case, those brought to trial included Tariq Aziz, Watban Ibrahim, Hamid Yusuf, Saadoun Shaker, Hikmat Mizban, and Sufyan Maher. Yet Ba’ath Party archival records identify hundreds, possibly thousands, of additional individuals alleged to have participated in these crimes. Many lived freely without legal consequence. Al-Mehiawy was one of them: a senior officer implicated in two of the most consequential atrocities of the Ba’ath era, and a recipient of high state honors for his role.

In 2007, several complaints were filed against al-Mehiawy in Austria by CHAK, a Kurdish human-rights organization, as well as by individual complainants. Austrian authorities opened preliminary inquiries and, in 2009, formally requested cooperation from Iraq, but no assistance was provided. In the absence of cooperation from Baghdad, the Austrian authorities ultimately closed the case. Although the limited available evidence and Iraq’s refusal to cooperate may have complicated any potential prosecution, Austria could still have pursued additional investigative avenues, particularly given the gravity of the allegations and the context of mass atrocities. No such efforts were undertaken.

Several factors appear to have diminished Austria’s willingness to pursue the case: Iraq’s refusal to assist; the absence of sustained media attention; limited political and civil-society pressure within Austria; and the significant resource requirements associated with reopening a complex international case. Had Austrian authorities received information regarding even a minor Holocaust perpetrator living within their jurisdiction, the state would almost certainly have acted differently. Such cases typically generate immediate public attention and strong political engagement.

This raises broader questions for Kurdish human-rights advocates. Beyond filing initial complaints, little appears to have been done in Austria to publicize the case or mobilize political and civil-society actors. When judicial authorities are reluctant to pursue a suspected genocide perpetrator, sustained engagement with domestic media, opposition parties, and civil-society groups becomes essential. To the extent that available evidence indicates, such steps were not taken. No Austrian newspaper publicly identified al-Mehiawy as an alleged participant in genocide. He ultimately died without facing judicial scrutiny.

His case reflects a wider pattern: many individuals accused of serious international crimes die without ever undergoing legal review. Figures such as Sheikh Jaafar Barzinji, Amer al-Rashid, Arshad Zebari, Mala Owzer, Wafiq al-Samarrai, Hamid al-Shaaban, Izzat al-Douri, and Tariq Ramadan, among many others, passed away without prosecution, despite substantial archival evidence implicating them in major violations.  Within the Kurdistan Region and Iraq, many former Iraqi officers alleged to have participated in the Anfal genocide have lived openly and have received social recognition and protection. Such forms of political or tribal patronage constitute ethically problematic practices that cannot efface the public memory of the crimes these individuals are alleged to have committed.

We have seen, in several cases, that when the remains of some of these figures were returned to Kurdistan, large public funerals and ceremonies were held for them without any questioning or objection from officials or influential circles. This reality reflects a troubling erosion of judicial principles and moral accountability in the Kurdistan Region under the influence of partisan power. It is an unhealthy and abnormal situation, one that has no parallels elsewhere.

The death of Naʿma Fares al-Mehiawy without trial represents a missed opportunity for accountability and highlights the persistent obstacles to post-conflict justice in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. For the relatives of the victims, it marks yet another loss, while the Iraqi government continues to approach the issue with noticeable indifference.